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Abstract
We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial in-
stitutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board mem-
bers. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest
and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return dif-
ference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of
upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected
directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of
adverse selection.
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1. Introduction
Corporate directors have access to material non-public information, which makes them a poten-
tial information source for professional traders. Directors are, of course, required to keep sensitive
material private: Delaware law recognizes a director’s duty of confidentiality, and corporations
have comprehensive policies in place to prevent leaks. Investors, too, face regulatory scrutiny and
reputational costs if they use inside information in traceable manners, and these safeguards seem to
be effective in some institutional settings (Griffin, Shu, and Topaloğlu, 2012). However, sensitive
information can travel through education networks from senior corporate officers to mutual fund
managers and sell-side analysts (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008, 2010). This raises an impor-
tant question: to what extent do director networks transmit information that sophisticated traders
are able to exploit?
We investigate whether the breadth of directors’ professional connections systematically affects
the likelihood of information leakage to sophisticated traders. Well connected directors interact
with scores of people, and unguarded conversations can easily reveal sensitive facts. In addi-
tion, Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) show that firms benefit from more connected boards because
board connections are a conduit of information exchange. Yet an important competitive advantage
of connected directors stems from their ability to provide insights that would otherwise be inac-
cessible to less connected colleagues. Fulfilling this role might require some deliberate sharing
of sensitive material. Sophisticated traders, who gather, analyze and interpret data from multi-
ple sources, have a comparative advantage when piecing together information about firms with
highly connected directors. We therefore study possible information transmission from corporate
directors to sophisticated traders by examining the relation between board connectedness and the
informativeness of trades made by short sellers, option traders, and institutional investors.
Our results indicate that these investor groups are indeed more informed when trading stocks
of companies with more connected boards. We measure informed trading as the monthly level of
short interest, the ratio of monthly option volume to stock volume, and weekly order imbalances
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of institutional traders. From BoardEx, we obtain the number of first-degree connections for each
director, which includes links through educational institutions attended, current and previous em-
ployers, military service and civic institutions. To ensure that our measure of board connectedness
is not driven by factors that have been documented to affect the firm’s information environment,
we first aggregate the connections of all board members and then orthogonalize them with respect
to firm size, board size, firm age, the number of analysts and institutional ownership. We exam-
ine portfolios sorted by board connectedness and each of the three measures of informed trading
and find that the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed
trading in highly connected boards is significantly more pronounced compared to the same re-
turn difference in firms with less connected boards. The economic magnitude ranges from 4% for
option volume and 5.4% for short interest, to 7.2% for institutional order imbalance.
Next, we examine whether the trades of sophisticated investors predict changes in firm fun-
damentals. Our results indicate that a higher fraction of negative earnings news is embedded in
prices of highly connected firms ahead of the announcement, and that sophisticated traders better
anticipate earnings surprises in firms with highly connected boards. Indeed, their trades predict
firm-specific news content more broadly, as our analysis of Thompson Reuters’ public news data
shows. Changes in board connectedness are also positively associated with changes in measures of
adverse selection costs, such as the probability of informed trading (PIN), bid-ask spreads and the
price impact measure of Amihud (2002). In a series of robustness checks we establish that neither
family ownership, corporate governance quality, nor asset tangibility, drive our findings.
Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we add novel insights to re-
cent studies examining the role of director networks in financial markets. Among directors these
networks contribute to higher firm performance (Larcker et al., 2013), the dissemination of CEO
compensation practices (Wong, Gygax, and Wang, 2015), stock option backdating (Bizjak, Lem-
mon, and Whitby, 2009), and earnings management (Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2012). Board members
and their social networks influence which companies become targets in change-of-control transac-
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tions (Stuart and Yim, 2010). Directors of Finnish firms earn sizable abnormal returns by trading
stocks where they have information advantages through their board connections (Berkman, Koch,
and Westerholm, 2014). We build on these insights by documenting that board connections in
general affect the external corporate information environment, increase the potential for informed
trading, and facilitate the dissemination of information into stock prices. While prior research
suggests that analysts, media outlets and managers have incentives to convey positive news (Mc-
Nichols and O’Brien, 1997; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009), we show that negative news, in
particular, flows through director networks.
Second, we contribute to research into the information sources of sophisticated traders. Short
sellers predict the outcome of earnings surprises (Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004), detect finan-
cial misconduct (Karpoff and Lou, 2010), and uncover hidden bad news in high levels of accruals
(Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2011). Short sellers excel in processing publicly available news (En-
gelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2012) and receive tips ahead of analyst downgrades (Christophe,
Ferri, and Hsieh, 2010). Option trades (Pan and Poteshman, 2006; Johnson and So, 2012) and in-
stitutional trades (Griffin, Harris, and Topaloğlu, 2003; Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz, 2009;
Puckett and Yan, 2011) also predict future stock prices. Our findings suggest that more connected
directors contribute, directly or inadvertently, to the information set of short sellers, option traders,
and institutional investors. More generally, we advance an emergent literature that examines how
a firm’s organizational structure affects its information environment. Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao
(2012) report that family ownership increases informed trading. We complement their findings by
directly linking the governance structure of the firm to sophisticated trading in the firm’s stock.
2. Identification strategy and hypotheses development
How does material non-public information flow from corporate insiders to sophisticated in-
vestors? What organizational characteristics restrain or exacerbate the magnitude of information
transmission? How does this affect trading and security prices? These questions, while essential
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to understand, are difficult to answer. Insiders can be found on every level of the corporate hierar-
chy, the sophistication of traders is not readily apparent, both groups have incentives to keep their
conversations about privileged information secret, and traders frequently disguise trades that could
trigger regulatory attention. In light of these challenges, we develop a novel identification strategy
that focuses on the possible information transmission between two important groups of people:
we investigate whether patterns in trading behavior and securities prices suggest that privileged
information flows from corporate directors to sophisticated traders.
By focusing on the board of directors, we study a group of clearly identifiable corporate in-
siders with privileged information about their firms. Unfettered access to material, non-public
information is necessary to monitor and advise management, the social networks of directors are
observable, and recent studies suggest that these networks are important conduits of information
exchange. We argue that sophisticated traders can obtain privileged information from directors
and trade profitably on that information before it becomes available to the broader market. If in-
formation is channeled towards sophisticated traders, their profitability will be high. In contrast, if
connected directors disseminate sensitive information broadly, prices will quickly incorporate it,
leaving smaller profit opportunities for sophisticated traders. As possible transmission channels we
consider inadvertent information leakage, deliberate sharing of sensitive information, and ‘mosaic’
information gathering. We discuss each channel in turn.
The risk of inadvertent information leakage increases with the size of the network of people
who are privy to material non-public information.1 Steele (1989) formalizes this idea, and models
the likelihood of disclosing a secret as proportional to the square of the number of people who know
the secret. More connections increase the difficulty of guarding against the unintended disclosure
of private information. We therefore expect that inadvertent information leakage will be more
pronounced for companies with more connected boards.
1Frederick C. Klein. “Merger Leaks Abound Causing Many Stocks to Rise Before the Fact.” Wall Street Journal
192 (12 July 1978), cited in Keown and Pinkerton (1981).
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Directors also face incentives to share sensitive information deliberately. After all, an impor-
tant competitive advantage of broadly connected directors stems from their ability to obtain and
share insights that would otherwise be inaccessible to less connected colleagues. Molm (2003) sug-
gests that reciprocal information sharing increases the status and influence of an individual within
a network. Fisman, Fisman, Galef, Khurana, and Wang (2012) remark that “board membership
more broadly creates a context for a kind of reciprocal attraction and friendship among a fraternity
of individuals.” While SEC enforcement actions allege that directors have deliberately provided
information to traders,2 our study does not assess the legality of directors’ actions. Reciprocal
sharing of sensitive material by connected directors does not necessarily harm shareholders; the
benefits of connectedness may outweigh the costs. Incentives related to reciprocal sharing simply
suggest that highly connected directors are more likely to divulge some sensitive information.
More connected directors may increase the amount of publicly available information in ways
that favor ‘mosaic’ information gathering by sophisticated investors. Jarrell (2011) argues: “Se-
curities analysts and investment managers legally gather, analyze and interpret large quantities
of information from multiple sources. From this information, investment recommendations and
decisions are routinely made. Not until the ‘bits and pieces’ of stray information are compiled
together into a ‘complete picture of the company’ does it sometimes reveal material, non-public
information. It is my understanding that under the ‘mosaic theory,’ analysts and investment man-
agers are free to act on this compilation of information without risking liability under the insider
trading laws.”3 Due to their extensive networks, more connected directors provide better access
to these ‘bits and pieces’: they are members of clubs, societies, and other firms, they are often
2For example, on October 26, 2011, the SEC charged former McKinsey global head Rajat Gupta with il-
legally tipping Raj Rajaratnam while serving on the boards of Goldman Sachs and Procter & Gamble, see
www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-223.htm. On September 20, 2012, the SEC charged a former member of the
board of directors at a North Carolina-based insurance company with illegally tipping inside information about an
impending merger, see www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-193.htm.
3See SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, et al., Civil Action No. 09-CV-8811 (S.D.N.Y) (JSR), Expert Report of Gregg A.
Jarrell (April 29, 2011, page 16).
5
invited to give speeches, and frequently interpret publicly available information about their firm.
While most investors lack the resources to piece together this kind of public information, sophisti-
cated traders physically track directors,4 comb through public records of their large consumer and
asset purchases and attend their invited speaking events. Some directors are even spied on.5 The
more connected the members of corporate boards are, the greater the amount of difficult-to-process
information that sophisticated trades might be able to access.
While inadvertent information leakage, deliberate tipping, and ‘mosaic’ information gathering
are three possible channels of information transmission, it is not clear that companies with more
connected directors are indeed associated with more informed trading: Federal regulations prohibit
selective disclosure, Delaware law recognizes the duty of confidentiality as part of a director’s duty
of loyalty, and corporate lawyers have developed comprehensive confidentiality policies to prevent
leaks. In addition, Griffin et al. (2012) argue that institutional investors are reluctant to use inside
information in traceable manners. Our null hypothesis is that there is no systematic link between
board connectedness and informed trading.
Banerjee and Eckard (2001), however, doubt that insider trading regulations effectively limit
informed trading. Many studies document informed trading among short sellers, option traders
and institutional investors, and more connected boards might increase the information flow to
these sophisticated traders. The information channels that we identify are not the only possible
ones, they are not necessarily illegal or mutually exclusive, and we are not assessing their relative
importance. Our alternative hypothesis simply states that sophisticated investors’ trades are more
informed when they trade shares in firms with more connected boards.
4On December 3, 2012, CNBC’s John Carney reported on “a fund manager who was allegedly paying off people
to discover who was coming in and out of Teterboro Airport, the small New Jersey airport catering to many New York
area private corporate jets,” see www.cnbc.com/id/100272132 (accessed 3/4/2016).
5On October 20, 2011, Jim Finkle of Reuters reported that hackers installed malicious software on the Nasdaq’s
computer system to spy on directors of publicly traded companies, see www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-nasdaq-
hacking-idUSTRE79J84T20111020 (accessed 3/4/2016).
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3. Sample selection, variables and descriptive statistics
3.1. Sample selection
The BoardEx database tracks connections of corporate directors and executives from 2002 on-
ward. Since we rely on BoardEx to quantify board connections, our sample period begins in Jan-
uary 2002 and ends in December 2011. Stock prices, trading volume and shares outstanding are
from CRSP, book-to-market ratios, leverage, ROA, R&D, industry segments, and other account-
ing variables are from COMPUSTAT, options data come from Ivy OptionMetrics, institutional
ownership and insider trading data are provided by Thomson Financial, and analysts’ forecasts
by I/B/E/S. We limit our analysis to common stocks (share code 10 or 11) of non-financial firms
traded on AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and require stocks to have at least twelve months of past
return data, at least ten days per month with available trades and return data, a month-end stock
price above one dollar, and sufficient data from COMPUSTAT to compute accounting ratios as of
December of the previous year.
3.2. Measures of informed trading
In our analysis we use three measures of informed trading. Our first measure is the monthly
level of Short Interest, defined as current shares sold short divided by total shares outstanding.
Monthly short interest data are available for the entire sample period for which we have board
characteristics and options data. Several studies, including Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005),
Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) and Karpoff and Lou (2010) use monthly short
interest as a measure of short selling activity, and document that short interest contains negative
information about stock prices and future firm fundamentals. Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010)
argue that absence of short interest can be viewed as a signal of good news. Thus, short interest
can signal bad news by its presence, or good news by its absence.
Our second measure of informed trading is the ratio of total monthly put and call trading vol-
ume to stock trading volume, or Option/Stock volume. Pan and Poteshman (2006) provide evidence
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of informed trading by using proprietary Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) option mar-
ket data. More recently, Johnson and So (2012) report that Option/Stock volume contains negative
information about future stock prices.
Our third measure of informed trading is institutional trading order imbalances. Griffin et al.
(2003), Campbell et al. (2009), and Puckett and Yan (2011) document that institutions are in-
formed traders whose trades predict stock returns. To measure institutional trading, we use the
weekly trading order imbalance of institutional traders in each stock. The trading order imbalance,
Institutional OIB, measures whether the observed weekly trading volume is dominated by institu-
tional buying or selling. We obtain transaction level data on institutional trading from Ancerno Ltd.
for the period from 2002 to 2011. For each stock, we calculate order imbalance as buyer minus
seller initiated institutional trading over a week, normalized by total institutional trading activity
measured as the total number of shares traded. A positive institutional trading order imbalance in-
dicates that institutions are net buyers, and a positive relation between weekly order imbalance and
future returns suggests that institutions are informed traders. We expect this relation between Insti-
tutional OIB and subsequent returns to be more pronounced for firms with more connected boards.
Following Johnson and So (2012), we transform all informed trading measures into decile ranks
and use the decile ranks of these variables in multivariate regressions that feature the particular
informed trading measure.
3.3. Measuring board connectedness
We obtain connections for each director from the BoardEx database and aggregate them at the
board level. This straightforward measure of board connections merely enumerates the number
of first-degree links for all directors on the board. This includes connections through educational
institutions attended, current and previous employers, military service as well as civic institutions
like non-profit boards.6 Yet this simple aggregation suffers from two obvious drawbacks. First,
6The same degree measure is used by Larcker et al. (2013). They also construct three additional measures of board
centrality and show in their Table 3 that this degree measure is highly correlated with all of them: The Spearman
8
by construction, this aggregation increases mechanically with the number of directors, leading to
a Spearman rank correlation of more than 0.6 between board size and aggregate connections.
Second, several factors have been identified in the literature to affect the firm’s information
environment and the potential returns from informed trading, which are also correlated with aggre-
gate director connections. For example, firm size affects the quality and quantity of information
that can be exploited by informed traders (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), but directors of larger
firms tend to be more connected within the BoardEx universe. Similarly, Zhang (2006) argues
that firm age captures differences of opinion related to future events, but directors of older firms
have more aggregate connections. Firms with more analyst following are also likely to have more
connected directors, but the amount of analyst coverage directly affects the information available
about the firm (Hong et al., 2000). Finally, D’Avolio (2002) provides evidence that institutional
ownership measures shorting costs because it affects the supply of lendable shares, and Cohen,
Diether, and Malloy (2007) document that the ability to exploit information depends on the ability
to access loaned shares. At the same time, directors of firms with more institutional investors also
tend to have more connections.
To ensure that our measure of board connectedness is not driven by any of these factors, we
regress the natural logarithm of aggregate board connections on the natural logarithms of firm size,
board size, firm age, number of analysts, and on institutional ownership, and use the residual values
from these year-end cross-sectional regressions, which we term Connectedness, to categorize firms
in our sample.
3.4. Additional control variables
Beyond orthogonalizing our Connectedness measure with respect to factors that have been
shown to jointly affect opportunities for informed traders and aggregate director connections, we
account in our multivariate regressions for characteristics of the firm’s information and contract-
correlation is 0.94 for their closeness, 0.92 for their betweenness, and 0.91 for their eigenvector measure.
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ing environment that might affect board characteristics or the measures of informed trading. For
example, growth opportunities (book-to-market) are an important proxy of the corporate informa-
tion environment that has been shown to affect a firm’s governance choices. However, firms that
are growing more slowly are less opaque, have less information uncertainty, and hence, lower op-
portunities for informed trading (Hong et al., 2000; Zhang, 2006). In contrast, higher research
and development (R&D) expenses lead to greater information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000,
among others), and complex firms, which operate in different industries or distinct business seg-
ments, have slower information diffusion (Cohen and Lou, 2012). Because these attributes could
attract informed traders and also affect board characteristics, we include in our analysis R&D ex-
penditure and the number of business segments in which the firm operates. We also control for
return on assets (ROA) since it attracts informed traders’ attention. We include liquidity, turnover
and return volatility (IVOL) in our analysis to ensure that our results are not driven by differences
in the cost of exploiting information (Pontiff, 2006) and include past return to control for short-
term reversal or medium-horizon stock price continuation (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Table 1
provides definitions for all control variables.
3.5. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents time-series averages of cross-sectional statistics for all companies in our sam-
ple. Since the number of available observations differs for our three measures of informed trading,
we report monthly statistics for the Short Interest sample in Panel A, for the Option/Stock volume
ratio sample in Panel B, and weekly statistics for the Institutional OIB sample in Panel C. The
average board in our BoardEx sample has around 4,000 aggregate connections. The distribution
of aggregate connections is skewed, with a median and standard deviation of around 3,000, and a
range from 225 to over 24,000 connections. After orthogonalization, which we describe in section
3.4, Connectedness (which is in natural logs) ranges from −1.7348 to 1.0987 in the Short Interest
sample, from −1.5636 to 1.0158 in the Option/Stock volume sample, and from −1.7468 to 1.0900
in the Institutional OIB sample. For the Short Interest and Institutional OIB samples, the average
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firm is around 25 years old and has a market capitalization that exceeds one billion dollars. The
Option/Stock volume sample requires companies with traded options, which limits us to companies
that are slightly older and larger: the average firm is around 26 years old with a market capital-
ization that exceeds seven billion dollars. Other firm characteristics do not notably differ across
the three samples. Average Short Interest is 4.9%, average Option/Stock volume is 3.8%, and the
average Institutional OIB is 5.0%.
Table 3 presents times series averages of cross-sectional Spearman rank correlations. Here
again, we report statistics for the Short Interest sample in Panel A, the Option/Stock volume sam-
ple in Panel B, and the Institutional OIB sample in Panel C. The correlations illustrate why we
orthogonalize aggregate connections to create the Connectedness measure. Aggregate connections
is highly correlated with several firm characteristics. Panel A reveals that the correlation coeffi-
cient is 0.61 for firm size, 0.62 for board size, 0.20 for firm age, 0.14 for the number of analysts,
and 0.46 for institutional ownership. By orthogonalizing we create a Connectedness measure that
is highly correlated with aggregate connections, yet largely uncorrelated with firm characteristics
that have been documented to affect the prevalence of informed trading. While the correlation co-
efficient between Connectedness and aggregate connection is 0.7, the correlations with firm size,
board size, firm age, number of analysts, and institutional ownership do not exceed 0.03. Connect-
edness effectively measures the cross-sectional variation in board connections, yet is far less likely
to reflect differences in the firm’s information environment.
4. Connectedness, informed trading, and stock returns
In this section we investigate the link between stock returns and informed trading across firms
with different Connectedness. We expect a stronger relation between our measures of informed
trading and future returns for companies with more connected boards.
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4.1. Portfolio analysis
We begin our analysis by sorting stocks into equal groups of low, medium, and high board
Connectedness, and then into quintiles based on the level of informed trading. In the Short Interest
and Option/Stock volume samples, portfolios are formed at the beginning of every month, held
for a month after portfolio formation, and portfolio returns are calculated as equally-weighted
averages of monthly stock returns. In the Institutional OIB sample, portfolios are formed every
week, held for a week after portfolio formation, and portfolio returns are calculated as equally-
weighted averages of weekly stock returns. We report time series averages alphas (αs) from the
Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993), augmented with a momentum factor
(Carhart, 1997). All tests of statistical significance are based on Newey-West standard errors.
Panel A of Table 4 displays portfolio results for the Short Interest sample. The first column,
labeled All, aggregates the Connectedness groups and confirms that, consistent with previous stud-
ies, Short Interest is negatively associated with subsequent stock returns. For the three lowest
short selling quintiles we find that subsequent returns are higher for more connected boards, which
is consistent with Larcker et al. (2013). Whereas Larcker et al. (2013) look at average returns
across connectedness portfolios, we examine informed trading within connectedness portfolios.
We find that the difference in risk-adjusted returns (αs) between the highest and lowest Short In-
terest quintile (S5 – S1) for the high Connectedness group is −1.161%, per month. In contrast,
the same difference is only −0.681% in the medium Connectedness group and −0.697% in the low
Connectedness group.
Put differently, the novel finding of our study is that the risk-adjusted return between the high
and low Short Interest groups (S5 – S1) is 0.464% per month more negative for firms with highly
connected boards than for firms with less connected boards, and this difference is statistically
significant at the one percent level (t-statistic = −3.89). This means that the annualized return
difference between the highest and lowest quintile of Short Interest in firms with highly connected
boards is about 5.4% more negative than the same return difference for firms with less connected
12
boards. High Short Interest predicts negative returns more strongly in firms with well connected
directors.
Panel B reports results for the Option/Stock volume sample. Again, the column labeled All ag-
gregates the Connectedness groups and indicates that Option/Stock volume is negatively associated
with future stock returns as documented by Johnson and So (2012). Consistent with the results for
Short Interest in Panel A, the difference in risk-adjusted returns between the highest and lowest
Option/Stock volume quintile (O/S5 – O/S1) is 0.340% per month more negative for firms with
highly connected boards than for firms with less connected boards, and this difference is again
statistically significant at the one percent level (t = −2.64). High Option/Stock volume also predicts
negative returns more strongly in firms with well connected directors.
Panel C presents results for the Institutional OIB sample. For each stock in the Ancerno
database the institutional trading imbalance (Institutional OIB) is constructed as institutional buys
minus institutional sells over a week. Unlike short interest or options trading, where informed
trading is associated with negative returns, higher Institutional OIB is associated with positive re-
turns, and lower Institutional OIB with negative returns. Consistent with the short interest and
option trading results, the risk-adjusted return between the high and low institutional order imbal-
ance groups (OIBS5 – OIBS1) is 0.134% per week more positive for firms with highly connected
boards than for firms with less connected boards, and this difference is statistically significant at
the five percent level (t = 2.14). This means that the annualized return difference between the
highest and lowest quintile of institutional order imbalance in firms with highly connected boards
is about 7.2% higher than the same return difference for firms with less connected boards.
We also examine time-varying patterns in return predictability within low and high connected
boards to ensure that our results are not driven by a specific time period. For example, our findings
could be affected by the passages of Regulation Fair Disclosure or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
restrict corporate information sharing and governance structure. Yet when we plot the annual quin-
tile hedge return for each connectedness tercile in Figure 1, we see no clear time-series pattern. All
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three informed trading measures predict stock returns more strongly in firms with well connected
directors, and these results are not driven by a particular subperiod. The results could be impacted
by other stock characteristics, so we investigate that possibility next.
4.2. Multivariate regressions
In this section, we extend the portfolio analysis from Section 4.1 by performing cross-sectional
multivariate regressions. These regressions allow us to control for various other stock character-
istics that could potentially affect the relation between our informed trading measures and returns
across different levels of Connectedness. In particular, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regressions of subsequent returns on the informed trading measures, Connectedness, and the inter-
action between the two, while controlling for several firm characteristics:
Returni,t+1 = α+ β1Mi,t + β2Connectednessi,t + β3Mi,t ×Connectednessi,t + β4Controlsi,t + εi,t, (1)
where Mi,t is one of our three informed trading measures: Short Interest, Option/Stock volume, or
Institutional OIB. The dependent variable is monthly return for the Short Interest and Option/Stock
volume samples, and weekly return for the Institutional OIB sample. If sophisticated traders are
more informed when trading stocks in firms with more connected boards, then we expect a negative
coefficient on the interaction term (β3 < 0) for the Short Interest and Option/Stock volume samples,
and a positive coefficient (β3 > 0) for the Institutional OIB sample.
The multivariate regression results in Table 5 support these predictions and corroborate the
portfolio results. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between the informed trading vari-
able, Mi,t, and Connectedness are −0.395 (t = −2.81) for Short Interest, −0.513 (t = −2.59) for
Option/Stock volume, and 0.094 (t = 2.10) for Institutional OIB. The positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient on the direct effect of Connectedness in the first two columns confirms previous
results by Larcker et al. (2013). Yet even after controlling for additional stock characteristics,
we find that short interest, options trading and institutional trade order imbalances contain more
information about future stock returns if the firms’ boards are more connected.
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5. Board connectedness, informed traders and earnings surprises
Our analysis so far suggests that the information content of short interest, options trading and
institutional order imbalances, as inferred from return predictability, is higher among firms with
more connected boards. In this section, we examine the role of firm Connectedness on the relation
between informed trading prior to earnings announcements and the earnings surprise. Earnings
announcements are scheduled events that often convey substantial information about firm funda-
mentals. If information transmission from boards provides private information about the future
prospects of the company, then trades of these investors should contain information about future
changes in firm fundamentals. We therefore expect a stronger relation between our informed trad-
ing measures prior to earnings announcements and subsequently announced earnings surprises for
companies with more connected boards.
We estimate quarterly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of earnings surprises on the informed
trading measures, Connectedness, and the interaction between the two, while controlling for sev-
eral firm characteristics. In other words, we run regressions of the form:
Earnings Surprisei,q = α+β1Mi,q+β2Connectednessi,q+β3Mi,q×Connectednessi,q+β4Controlsi,q+εi,q,
(2)
Mi,q is one of our three informed trading measures: Short Interest, Option/Stock volume, or Institu-
tional OIB. These are measured one month prior to the month of the earnings announcement in the
case of Short Interest and Option/Stock volume, or the week prior in the case of Institutional OIB.
We use three different measures of earnings surprises: Unexpected Earnings, Standardized
Unexpected Earnings (SUE) and Analyst Surprise. Unexpected Earnings is calculated as (EPS i,q−
EPS i,q−4)/Pi,q−4, where EPS i,q and EPS i,q−4 are earnings per share before extraordinary items
for firm i in quarters q and q − 4, respectively, and Pi,q−4 is the stock price in quarter q − 4.
Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) is patterned after Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) as
(EPS i,q −EPS i,q−4 −µi,q)/σi,q, where µi,q and σi,q are the mean and standard deviations of earnings
changes (EPS i,q − EPS i,q−4) in the previous eight quarters. Analyst Surprise is the difference
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between actual earnings per share (EPS) reported in I/B/E/S in quarter q, and the median of the
most recent forecasts made by analysts following the firm over the 90 days prior to the earnings
announcement; this difference is then scaled by Pi,q−4. We employ the same control variables as in
Table 5, which are all measured one month prior to the month of the earnings announcement. As
before, we expect a negative coefficient on the interaction term (β3 < 0) for the Short Interest and
Option/Stock volume samples, and a positive coefficient (β3 > 0) for the Institutional OIB sample.
Columns (1) – (3) of Table 6 indicate that our measures of informed trading predict unexpected
earnings more strongly in firms with more connected boards. The estimated coefficient on the
interaction between the informed trading variable and Connectedness is −0.681 (t = −2.52) for
Short Interest and −0.439 (t = −3.69) for Option/Stock volume. The same coefficient in the In-
stitutional OIB sample is positive, as predicted, but falls short of being statistically significant at
conventional levels (0.259, t = 1.42). We find similar results when we use SUE as our measure of
earnings surprise in columns (4) – (6). Both Short Interest and Option/Stock volume predict SUE
more strongly in firms with more connected boards; the estimated coefficient on the interaction
between the informed trading variable and Connectedness is −5.640 (t = −3.07) for Short Interest
and −4.884 (t = −2.26) for Option/Stock volume when the dependent variable is SUE. Results are
less precise when we use Analyst Surprise to measure earnings surprise in columns (7) – (9), but
even here we find that both Option/Stock volume (β = −0.046, t = −1.99) and Institutional OIB
(β = 0.041, t = 1.78) predict unexpected earnings more strongly in firms with more connected
boards. Taken together, these results corroborate our previous findings that sophisticated traders
have some information advantage when trading stocks of firms with more connected directors.
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that informed traders are capitalizing on ad-
vanced knowledge of earnings information. An alternative interpretation would suggest that highly
connected directors actually guard sensitive information more effectively, that therefore their firms
are more likely to be misvalued, and that sophisticated investors successfully exploit this misval-
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uation.7 This alternative explanation also predicts, for opposite reasons, more profitable informed
trading in firms with more connected boards. One way of distinguishing these two alternative
explanations is to examine how news gets embedded into prices ahead of important information
events such as earnings announcements.
Kothari et al. (2009) show that stock prices incorporate a greater fraction of total earnings news
ahead of positive earnings announcements when compared to negative earnings announcements,
suggesting that managers withhold bad news relative to good news. If highly connected boards
increase inadvertent or deliberate information leakage to sophisticated traders, a greater fraction
of earnings news should be embedded into prices ahead of the earnings announcements in highly
connected firms. In contrast, if highly connected directors better guard sensitive information than
less connected directors, a greater fraction of earnings news should be embedded into prices prior
to announcements in less connected firms.
To investigate this assertion we plot stock returns prior to earnings announcements for the high
and low board Connectedness groups. We present scaled cumulative average abnormal returns for
good news and bad news over a three-month period leading up to the earnings announcements.
We classify the lowest decile of earnings surprises as bad news and the highest decile of earnings
surprises as good news. Following Kothari et al. (2009) we use the total return over the window
to scale returns, which provides an estimate of the fraction of total news revealed over that time
period. If more news is leaked prior to earnings surprises, we expect a higher fraction of news to
be revealed over time.
For the high and low board Connectedness groups, we present results for bad news in Panel
A, and results for good news in Panel B of Figure 2. The graphs in Panel A show that firms with
highly connected boards release about 87% of bad news ahead of earnings announcements, while
firms with less connected boards release about 63% of bad news. In contrast, Panel B shows no
7We thank the editor for bringing this argument to our attention.
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discernible difference between the high and low board Connectedness groups. This finding indi-
cates that a greater fraction of negative news is revealed for highly connected firms, which suggests
that highly connected directors more readily facilitate the transmission of privileged information;
it does not support the argument that highly connected directors are better stewards of privileged
information than less connected directors.
At first glance, Figure 2 might suggest that the potential return for short sellers ahead of bad
earnings news in highly connected firms is lower than the potential return in less connected firms.
This would seem to contradict the central finding in our paper that short sellers who trade in stocks
of firms with highly connected boards earn higher profits than those who trade in stocks of less
connected firms. However, this inconsistency arises only if one assumes that, prior to earnings
announcements, short sellers are equally likely to trade ahead of bad news in both highly and less
connected firms. This is not the case; short sellers trade more readily in stocks of more connected
firms because they are able to obtain more privileged information about them. In other words,
the information flow ahead of earnings is not broadly disseminated, but is channeled towards so-
phisticated traders. These traders are thus more often correct when trading in stocks with highly
connected boards, and, hence, earn higher profits.
6. Board connectedness, informed traders and firm-specific news sentiment
Sophisticated traders predict stock returns more accurately for firms with more connected
boards, and some information transmission occurs, apparently, prior to quarterly earnings dis-
closures. In addition to corporate earnings, directors are privy to a wide variety of value-relevant
information such as new product launches, acquisitions, restructurings, layoffs, accounting restate-
ments, loss of major contracts, or departures of key executives. In this section, we investigate
whether the trades of short sellers, option trader, and institutional investors more strongly predict
the sentiment of firm-specific news for firms with more connected boards. For those firms we
expect that higher Short Interest, higher Options/Stock volume, and lower Institutional OIB bet-
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ter predict negative corporate news, while lower Short Interest, lower Options/Stock volume, and
higher Institutional OIB better predict positive corporate news.
To test this prediction, we estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of firm-specific news
Sentiment on each of the informed trading measures (Mi,t), Connectedness, and the interaction
between the two, while controlling for several other firm characteristics:
Sentimenti,t+1 = α+β1Mi,t +β2Connectednessi,t +β3Mi,t×Connectednessi,t +β4Controlsi,t +εi,t (3)
As before, Mi,t denotes Short Interest, Option/Stock volume, or Institutional OIB.
The dependent variable, Sentiment, is a text-based sentiment measure of firm-specific news in
the media, aggregated over a month or a week. The data come from Thomson Reuters News An-
alytics and are available from 2003. Thomson collects corporate news items from public sources,
uses computational linguistics to classify each item according to its relevance, sentiment, novelty,
and topic, and provides three sentiment scores for each item: negative, neutral and positive. Each
score takes a value from 0 to 100, but the scores in the three categories always sum to 100. Higher
scores in a specific sentiment category indicate that the news is more likely to belong to that cat-
egory. For each news item, we calculate the difference between positive and negative sentiment
scores, so that a higher difference reflects a more positive news content. For each firm, we average
across these differences to obtain our measure of monthly or weekly firm-specific news Sentiment.
To ensure that our firm-specific sentiment measure is based on novel fundamental news about in-
dividual companies, we exclude news items categorized as ‘order imbalances’ or ‘stock prices’ to
eliminate news stories that simply mention stock price movements. We also exclude news with a
‘relevance score’ below 50 to capture only firm-specific news, and we eliminate repeated news.8
The results of our news sentiment analysis are presented in Table 7. Our measures of informed
trading predict not only earnings surprises more strongly in firms with more connected boards,
8Thomson’s ‘relevance score’ takes a value from 0 to 100, where a higher value indicates that the firm is a more
important subject of the news story. Thomson’s ‘novelty’ variable provides the number of related news items over the
previous 24 hours; we exclude news items with novelty scores greater than one.
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but also firm-specific news sentiment: The estimated coefficient on the interaction between the
informed trading variable and Connectedness is −1.4454 (t = −2.32) for Short Interest, −1.639
(t = −3.07) for Option/Stock volume, and 1.242 (t = 2.26) for Institutional OIB. Taken together,
the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that sophisticated traders have greater insights about upcoming
earnings and firm-specific news when trading stocks in firms with more connected boards.
7. Alternative explanations, robustness tests, and corroborating evidence
Short sellers, option traders, and institutional investors seem to be more informed about up-
coming earnings and news of firms with highly connected boards, and their trades predict stock
returns better as Connectedness increases. In this section, we focus on three alternative explana-
tions for our findings by examining the role of family ownership, corporate governance and asset
tangibility. These factors could influence the firm’s information environment and strengthen the
relation between informed trading and subsequent stock returns, while also being related to the
Connectedness of the firm. We also perform a battery of other robustness tests.
7.1. Family ownership
In a recent study, Anderson et al. (2012) find more informed short sales in family-controlled
firms than in firms with diffuse ownership. If family-owned firms also happen to have more con-
nected boards, our results might be due to ownership characteristics. To explore this possibility,
we create a family firm indicator variable using the definition of family firm and data from An-
derson et al. (2012). We then replicate the multivariate regressions tests from Table 5 and include
the family firm indicator by itself, as well as an interaction of the family firm indicator and our
measures of informed trading, as additional control variables. The findings are reported in Panel
A of Table 8. In our analysis, for each measure of informed trading, we report results with and
without Connectedness.
Consistent with Anderson et al. (2012), short sellers appear to be more informed when trading
the shares of family firms, yet accounting for family firm status does not change our inference:
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measures of directional trading by sophisticated investors are stronger predictors of future returns
among firms with more connected boards. These findings might not be surprising; Anderson and
Reeb (2004, p. 221, Table1) document that family firms do not differ from other firms with respect
to board size, and board size and board Connectedness are highly correlated. Anderson et al.
(2012) link trading by sophisticated investors to ownership structure while our study links it to an
aspect of board structure. The two phenomena appear to be distinct.
7.2. Corporate governance
Effective governance can enhance financial transparency by mitigating executives’ incentives
to distort information disclosures (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) and may increase operational
transparency by limiting executives’ ability to expropriate firm value through shirking, empire
building, or perquisite consumption (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). Chung, Elder, and Kim
(2010) report that firms with better corporate governance are associated with higher liquidity and
lower probability of information-based trading. This suggests that, on the one hand, governance
quality affects the firms’ information environment. On the other hand, several studies link gover-
nance quality to board connections. Guedj and Barnea (2009) find weaker monitoring among more
connected directors, and several studies document that value-decreasing practices like option back-
dating can spread through board networks (Bizjak et al., 2009). Together, these studies raise the
concern that our results are not indicative of information transmission through director networks to
sophisticated traders; instead, weak corporate governance might be associated with higher board
connections and also create an information environment more conducive to informed trading. We
investigate this possibility.
To proxy for the quality of monitoring, we create the variable Outsider, which is the fraction of
independent directors on the board. We replicate the multivariate regression tests from Table 5 and
include Outsider by itself, an interaction term of Outsider with each measure of informed trading,
as well as additional control variables. In Panel B of Table 8 we report the results first without, and
then with interacted Connectedness. While the informativeness of Short Interest and Institutional
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OIB seem unaffected by board independence, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for
Option/Stock volume × Outsider suggests that option traders are less informed when trading stocks
in firms with a greater fraction of outside directors. This finding can be interpreted as supporting
the notion that stronger governance is associated with a lower probability of information-based
trading (Chung et al., 2010). Even so, accounting for the fraction of outside directors does not
change our inference: measures of informed trading predict returns more strongly in firms with
more connected boards. In untabulated tests, we replace the fraction of outside directors with the
entrenchment index (E-index) of Bebchuk et al. (2009) as an alternative measure of governance
quality and confirm that our inference remains unchanged.
7.3. Asset tangibility
Sophisticated investors may have a distinct advantage when trading the shares of firms with
high levels of intangible assets. Such firms might offer greater opportunities to exploit private
information or to profit from sophisticated processing of public information. Faleye, Kovacs, and
Venkateswaran (2014) argue that firms with better connected executives exploit intangible assets
more efficiently because connections help CEOs identify, evaluate, and exploit innovative ideas.
This raises the concern that the level of asset intangibility is correlated with Connectedness, which
may, in fact, explain our results. To explore this possibility, we create an asset tangibility variable,
defined as the ratio of Property, Plants, and Equipment (PPE) to total assets. We replicate the
multivariate regression tests from Table 5 and include asset tangibility by itself, an interaction term
of asset tangibility with each measure of informed trading, as well as additional control variables.
In Panel C of Table 8 we report our findings first without, and then with interacted Connect-
edness. The statistically significant coefficients do indeed suggest that measures of directional
trade are stronger predictors of future returns among firms with more intangible assets; the esti-
mated coefficients on the interaction between the informed trading variable and asset tangibility
are 1.289 (t = 3.31) for Short Interest and −0.189 (t = −1.91) for Institutional OIB. However, the
return predictability of trading activity by sophisticated investors remains higher among firms with
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more connected boards even after accounting for the role of asset tangibility: the estimated coef-
ficients on the interaction between the informed trading variable and Connectedness are −0.386
(t = −2.92) for Short Interest, −0.468 (t = −2.74) for Option/Stock volume, and 0.093 (t = 1.96)
for Institutional OIB. In an additional untabulated analysis, we replace asset tangibility with the
book-to-market ratio and verify that our inference remains unchanged.
7.4. Insider trading
Insider trading predicts future firm performance (see Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski, 2012, for
a recent review) and sophisticated traders use information contained in insider trades (Engelberg
et al., 2012). If board Connectedness simply proxies for the level of insider trading, our results
could be due to traders’ superior ability to gather information contained in insider trading activ-
ity. To investigate this possibility we obtain insider trading data from Thomson Financial. In
untabulated analysis, we repeat the multivariate analysis reported in Table 5 while controlling for
both contemporaneous and lagged measures of insider trading since sophisticated traders might
consider information contained in past insider trades. Even after we account for insider trading,
measures of informed trading continue to predict future stock returns more strongly among stocks
with more connected boards.
7.5. Corporate employees
It is conceivable that the degree of corporate information leakage is affected by the size of
the firm’s workforce. The number of people employed by the firm may be correlated with board
Connectedness even after accounting for firm size, board size and other firm characteristics, and
this may explain our results. To address this possibility, we include the number of employees
as an additional control variable when orthogonalizing aggregate connections, thereby creating a
modified Connectedness measure that explicitly accounts for the number of employees. We then
replicate the multivariate regressions tests from Table 5 and include the number of employees as an
additional control variable. In untabulated tests, we confirm that the number of employees does not
23
explain the relation between measures of informed trading and subsequent stock returns in firms
with more connected boards.
7.6. Short flow as a measure of short selling
So far we have used monthly Short Interest to measure short selling, which is available for
the entire sample period. However, monthly Short Interest is a snapshot of the short positions at
the midst of the month and may not capture the entire information flow from short sellers. While
our inferences drawn from monthly Short Interest are consistent with those based on Option/Stock
volume and Institutional OIB, we nevertheless investigate whether using short flow data changes
our findings. To this end, we obtain transaction-level data from a pilot program under the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s Regulation SHO (Reg SHO). The SEC mandated Reg SHO data
collection in 2005 and we collect the data through 2010. Because Reg SHO data are available for
only half of our sample period, and because board Connectedness changes slowly over time, using
these data limits the inferences we can draw from tests that rely on within-firm variation.
For each stock, we aggregate Reg SHO short sale trades over a week and scale it by the total
number of shares traded over the same week to create a short flow variable. Analogous to our
tests in Table 5 we regress returns for the subsequent week on short flow, Connectedness, and the
intersection between the two. In untabulated tests, we observe that the estimated coefficient on the
interaction between short flow and Connectedness is significantly negative (−0.137, t = −1.97).
Even when short selling is measured with short flow data, short selling predicts subsequent returns
more strongly for firms with more connected boards.
7.7. Within-firm variation in board connectedness
Throughout this paper, our inferences have been drawn from cross-sectional differences across
firms. We predict, and show, that at any point in time, sophisticated traders are better able to
predict returns, earnings, and news sentiment for firms with more connected boards than for firms
with less connected boards. In this section, we investigate the effect of within-firm variation in
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board connectedness on the predictiveness of sophisticated trades. As a corporate board becomes
more connected, we expect the trades of short sellers, option traders, and institutional investors to
become more predictive about future returns. Since board structure is relatively persistent over our
sample period, we expect that the economic magnitude of within-firm variation in Connectedness
is less than the magnitude of cross-sectional firm variation. To investigate this, we carry out fixed
effects regression of returns on the informed trading measures, Connectedness, and the interaction
between the two, while controlling for various firm characteristics. This specification is the same
as Equation (1) augmented with firm-fixed effects.
Table 9 displays firm-fixed effects regressions for our three measures of informed trading. The
within-firm results are consistent with our previous findings as the estimated coefficient on the
interaction between the informed trading variable and Connectedness is −0.804 (t = −2.05) for
Short Interest, −0.988 (t = −2.09) for Option/Stock volume, and 0.097 (t = 1.79) for Institutional
OIB. As board Connectedness increases within a particular firm, measures of informed trading
predict subsequent returns to a greater extent. Similarly, as Connectedness decreases within a firm,
measures of informed trading predict subsequent returns to a lesser extent. These results support
our inference from other cross-sectional tests: sophisticated traders seem better informed about
upcoming earnings and firm-specific news for firms with highly connected boards, and their trades
predict stock returns more strongly in these firms.
8. Board connectedness and adverse selection
So far our findings suggest that sophisticated traders are more informed when trading stocks in
firms with more connected boards. If greater Connectedness expands the private information avail-
able to investors, adverse selection should increase as well. We test this argument by examining
the relation between changes in Connectedness and three measures of adverse selection: the prob-
ability of informed trading (PIN), the bid-ask spread (Spread) and Illiquidity. Our PIN measure
comes from Brown and Hillegeist (2007), who extend the measure developed by Easley, Kiefer,
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and O’Hara (1997). Spread is the difference between ask and bid price divided by the mid point of
the bid and ask spread, averaged over a year to obtain the average annual bid ask spread. Illiquidity
is constructed as in Amihud (2002, p. 34) and measures price impact.9 The results are presented
in Table 10.
In Panel A, firms are sorted into quintiles based on average annual changes in Connectedness.
We report the mean change in Connectedness and the mean change in each of our three measures of
adverse selection for each of the quintiles. As we move from the quintile with the largest decrease
in Connectedness (C1) to the quintile with the largest increase (C5), we see a corresponding change
in the PIN measure. In the quintile with the largest decrease in Connectedness, PIN decreases, on
average, by 0.611%; in the quintile with the largest increase in Connectedness, PIN increases, on
average, by 0.641%. Thus, firms that have the largest annual increase in Connectedness experience
an annual increase in the probability of informed trading that is 1.252% (t = 5.49) greater than that
experienced by firms with the largest decrease in Connectedness. This difference is economically
significant given that the average PIN value in our sample is 10.63%. We find similar results with
respect to our two other measures of adverse selection. As we move from the quintile with the
largest decrease in Connectedness (C1) to the quintile with the largest increase (C5), the change in
Spread and Illiquidity increase by 0.098 (t = 2.08) and 0.051 (t = 2.70) respectively. In Panel B, we
carry out regressions of changes in the adverse selection measures on changes in Connectedness,
while controlling for several firm characteristics. The results are in line with those from the port-
folio analysis in Panel A: There is a strong positive association between changes in Connectedness
and changes in all three adverse selection measures.
Taken together, the findings in Table 10 indicate that changes in Connectedness of a firm are
positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection. In a frictionless market, so-
phisticated traders signal through their trading the private information they have received. As soon
9We are grateful to the referee for proposing this test and to Stephen Brown for generously sharing his data with
us, which are based on Easley et al. (1997).
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as their trading activity becomes public knowledge, the remaining investors trade in the direction
of the sophisticated traders until stock prices reflect the signaled information. Absent frictions,
we do not expect to observe return predictability for stocks of firms with more connected boards
once measures of informed trading are publicly observable. The evidence presented in this sec-
tion, however, suggests that board Connectedness is associated with greater adverse selection risk.
This risk might make it too costly for uninformed investors to free ride on measures of informed
directional trade. It is therefore possible that we observe return predictability among firms with
more connected boards because adverse selection risk prevents investors from trading on publicly
available information embedded in the trades of sophisticated traders.
9. Conclusion
We examine information transmission between corporate insiders and sophisticated traders by
studying whether board Connectedness predicts the extent to which short sellers, option traders,
and institutional investors are informed. Having more connected directors on the board can in-
crease the possibility of inadvertent information leakage. It also increases the amount of difficult-
to-process information, which tends to favor sophisticated investors. Some directors might even tip
off traders deliberately. Consistent with our hypothesis we find that measures of sophisticated trad-
ing activity predict subsequent equity returns among firms with more connected boards. When we
compare the difference in risk-adjusted returns between stocks traded the most and stocks traded
the least by sophisticated investors across firms with highly connected boards and firms with low
board connections, we find return differences ranging from 4% to 7.2% per year, depending on the
measure employed. Sophisticated traders are better informed about upcoming earnings and firm-
specific news for firms with highly connected boards. In addition, changes in board Connectedness
are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection in trading.
In a series of robustness checks we examine alternate econometric specifications and establish
that our findings are not driven by family ownership, corporate governance, asset tangibility, insider
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trading, or the number of employees. Our results are striking because federal regulations prohibit
selective disclosure, Delaware law recognizes the duty of confidentiality, and corporate lawyers
have developed comprehensive confidentiality policies to prevent leaks. Furthermore, most ob-
servable firm characteristics that are positively correlated with board Connectedness are negatively
correlated with informed trading. While we discuss three channels through which information can
flow from directors to sophisticated traders, we do not claim that these are the only transmission
mechanisms and we are not assessing the relative importance of these information channels. Do-
ing so would require more granular data than available to us, so we have to leave investigations
of channel-specific information flow for future research projects. Since we cannot reliably access
whether the information flow from directors to traders violates existing securities law, we caution
against drawing cursory regulatory implications from our findings.
We are first in showing that the Connectedness of corporate boards, directly or inadvertently,
affects the information set of short sellers, option traders, and institutional investors. These so-
phisticated investors exploit trading opportunities that more connected boards create and are par-
ticularly well informed about upcoming earnings and firm-specific news in firms with high board
Connectedness. By directly linking corporate governance structure to the information environment
in which these investors operate, we contribute to the emerging literature on director networks, and
to research into the sources of traders’ information.
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Aggregate connections: Number of first-degree links for all directors on the board provided by BoardEx.
Analyst Surprise: Actual earnings per share minus median of most recent analyst forecasts scaled by stock
price, obtained from I/B/E/S.
Number of Analysts: Number of analysts following the stock. The data on analysts are obtained from I/B/E/S.
Board size: Total number of directors on the board of the company.
Book-to-Market: Ratio of book value to market value of equity.
Connectedness: Regression residual obtained from regressing the natural logarithm of aggregate connections
on the natural logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of analysts and institutional ownership.
Number of Employees: Number of employees provided by COMPUSTAT.
Firm age: Total number of years the company has been listed in CRSP.
Firm size: Market value of equity calculated as number of shares outstanding times the month-end share price.
Illiquidity: Amihud (2002) illiquidity, absolute value of daily returns divided by dollar trading volume aver-
aged over a month. We require at least 10 days of return-to-volume ratios per month to compute Illiquidity.
Institutional ownership: Sum of the holdings of all institutions for each stock in each quarter, divided by
the number of shares outstanding obtained from CRSP. Stocks that have available return data but no reported
institutional holdings are assumed to have zero institutional ownership.
Institutional OIB: Institutional trade order imbalance, measured as buyer minus seller initiated institutional
trading over a week, normalized by total institutional trading in shares of a stock.
Leverage: Ratio of total long-term-debt to total assets.
Momentum: Cumulative return over the previous 12 months.
Option: Indicator equal to one if the firm has any exchange traded option (zero otherwise).
Option/Stock volume: Ratio of total option volume traded (put plus call) to total common stock traded.
PIN: Probability of Informed Trading measure constructed by Brown and Hillegeist (2007).
ROA: Return on Assets, previous year-end ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets.
R&D: Previous year-end ratio of research and development expenses to total assets. Missing research and
development expenses are set to be 0.
Return: Monthly stock return contemporaneous with short interest.
IVOL: Idiosyncratic return volatility, the standard deviation of residuals from the Fama-French (1993) model
augmented with a momentum factor. We require at least 10 days of returns to compute IVOL.
Number of Segments: How many industry business segments (STYPE) the firm operated the previous year.
Sentiment: Aggregate difference in text-based positive and negative sentiment scores of firm-specific news.
Short interest: Total shares shorted divided by total shares outstanding.
Spread: Ask minus bid price divided by the mid point of this bid-ask spread, averaged over one year.
SUE: Standardized unexpected earnings, the standardized difference between reported earnings and expected
earnings, assuming that earnings follows a seasonal random walk with a trend.




This table presents time-series averages of cross-sectional summary statistics for the short interest sample
(Panel A), the Option/Stock volume sample (Panel B), and the institutional trading order imbalance (Insti-
tutional OIB) sample (Panel C). The sample consists of common stocks listed on AMEX, NASDAQ and
NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December 2011. Connectedness is
the residual obtained from a regression of the natural logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural
logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of analysts and institutional ownership. All other firm
characteristics are as defined in Table 1.
Panel A: Summary statistics for the short interest sample
Mean Median StdDev Min Max
Connectedness 0.0011 0.0591 0.5192 −1.7348 1.0987
Aggregate Connections 3,970 3,153 2,999 225 24,239
Board size 9.264 9.000 2.454 4.000 25.000
Firm size 6.936 1.624 20.901 0.014 300.395
Short Interest 0.049 0.035 0.056 0 0.815
IVOL 0.026 0.023 0.014 0.004 0.159
Institutional ownership 0.718 0.769 0.208 0.006 0.999
Momentum 0.160 0.085 0.522 −0.818 6.535
Turnover 2.091 1.574 2.007 0.016 26.038
Return 0.011 0.006 0.115 −0.466 0.959
Book-to-Market 0.761 0.505 1.904 0 45.718
Illiquidity 0.730 0.002 19.856 0 586.906
Number of Analysts 9.483 7.813 7.288 0 39.500
Return on Assets 0.021 0.042 0.152 −1.771 0.454
Leverage 0.174 0.151 0.164 0 0.847
Option 0.798 1.000 0.393 0 1.000
Number of Segments 8.168 7.913 5.432 1 28.450
R&D 0.038 0.000 0.075 0 0.710
Firm Age 24.743 17.294 19.243 1.858 81.125
# Firm / Month Observations 115,978
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Panel B: Summary statistics for the Option/Stock volume sample
Mean Median StdDev Min Max
Connectedness 0.0003 0.0617 0.4908 −1.5636 1.0158
Aggregate Connection 4,461 3,660 3,172 339 24,233
Board size 9.468 9.000 2.461 4.395 23.866
Firm size 8.907 2.465 23.972 0.063 300.842
Option/Stock volume 0.038 0.015 0.072 0 0.908
IVOL 0.025 0.022 0.013 0.005 0.130
Institutional ownership 0.763 0.795 0.164 0.076 0.999
Momentum 0.138 0.080 0.448 −0.763 4.534
Turnover 2.335 1.780 2.040 0.160 23.700
Return 0.009 0.006 0.105 −0.425 0.667
Book-to-Market 0.599 0.448 0.743 0.008 12.664
Illiquidity 0.735 0.001 20.023 0 548.178
Number of Analysts 11.416 10.000 7.233 0 39.454
Return on Assets 0.037 0.048 0.121 −1.196 0.447
Leverage 0.176 0.159 0.160 0 0.803
Number of Segments 8.340 8.197 5.559 1 28.437
R&D 0.038 0.002 0.068 0 0.578
Firm Age 26.200 18.732 20.326 1.868 81.099
# Firm / Month Observations 80,042
Panel C: Summary statistics for the institutional trading order imbalance sample
Mean Median STD Min Max
Connectedness −0.0011 0.0586 0.5178 −1.7468 1.0900
Aggregate connections 4,022 3,212 3,013 226 24,241
Board size 9.316 9.000 2.447 4.030 24.976
Firm size 7.182 1.710 21.283 0.020 300.382
Institutional OIB 0.050 0.064 0.605 −1 1.000
IVOL 0.023 0.019 0.017 0.001 0.197
Institutional Ownership 0.726 0.773 0.200 0.006 0.999
Momentum 0.156 0.085 0.502 −0.808 6.168
Turnover 2.125 1.600 2.011 0.013 25.729
Return 0.002 0.001 0.049 −0.279 0.402
Book-to-Market 0.725 0.499 1.305 0.005 25.154
Illiquidity 0.075 0.002 1.147 0 30.918
Number of Analysts 9.674 8.034 7.272 0 39.551
Return on Assets 0.026 0.043 0.145 −1.675 0.452
Leverage 0.175 0.153 0.163 0 0.846
Option 0.806 1.000 0.384 0 1.000
Number of Segments 8.255 8.080 5.473 1 28.753
R&D 0.036 0.000 0.073 0 0.700
Firm Age 25.140 18.098 19.346 1 81.102




This table presents cross-sectional correlations among key variables in the short interest sample (Panel A), the option/stock volume
sample (Panel B), and the institutional trading order imbalance sample (Panel C). The sample consists of common stocks listed
on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December 2011. Connected-
ness is the residual obtained from a regression of the natural logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural logarithm of firm
size, board size, firm age, number of analysts and institutional ownership. All other firm characteristics are as defined in Table 1.


















































































Aggregate connections 0.70 1.00
Short Interest -0.02 -0.16 1.00
Board size 0.00 0.62 -0.21 1.00
Firm size 0.03 0.61 -0.22 0.50 1.00
IVOL 0.06 -0.20 0.20 -0.28 -0.41 1.00
Institutional ownership 0.03 0.14 0.27 0.01 0.23 -0.13 1.00
Momentum -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.02 1.00
Turnover 0.04 0.12 0.49 -0.06 0.19 0.30 0.44 0.09 1.00
Number of Segments 0.05 0.24 -0.21 0.32 0.28 -0.21 -0.03 0.01 -0.14 1.00
Return 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00
Book-to-Market -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 0.09 -0.31 0.07 -0.13 -0.31 -0.26 0.12 -0.09 1.00
Illiquidity 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.20 0.10 -0.20 -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 0.01 0.16 1.00
Number of Analysts 0.03 0.46 0.06 0.26 0.68 -0.18 0.37 -0.05 0.47 0.03 -0.03 -0.26 -0.19 1.00
Return on Assets -0.14 0.04 -0.07 0.10 0.29 -0.31 0.18 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 0.17 1.00
Leverage -0.02 0.10 0.04 0.21 0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.07 1.00
Firm Age 0.02 0.20 -0.16 0.35 0.32 -0.28 0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.35 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.15 0.11 1.00
Option 0.08 0.30 0.23 0.12 0.42 -0.08 0.32 -0.01 0.45 0.03 -0.03 -0.22 -0.17 0.52 0.07 0.03 0.04 1.00
R&D 0.27 0.03 0.11 -0.26 -0.17 0.26 -0.09 -0.03 0.15 -0.22 -0.01 -0.28 -0.01 0.00 -0.41 -0.22 -0.21 0.06 1.00
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Aggregate connections 0.70 1.00
Option/Stock volume 0.04 0.18 1.00
Board size 0.00 0.65 0.02 1.00
Firm size 0.03 0.60 0.37 0.52 1.00
IVOL 0.05 -0.23 0.14 -0.29 -0.41 1.00
Institutional ownership 0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.03 1.00
Momentum -0.06 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.04 0.06 1.00
Turnover 0.00 -0.10 0.44 -0.19 -0.08 0.48 0.29 0.08 1.00
Number of Segments 0.07 0.28 -0.10 0.32 0.29 -0.21 -0.08 0.00 -0.24 1.00
Return -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
Book-to-Market -0.04 -0.04 -0.33 0.12 -0.24 0.05 -0.05 -0.33 -0.13 0.15 -0.10 1.00
Illiquidity 0.07 -0.19 -0.17 -0.21 -0.41 0.24 -0.19 -0.12 -0.21 -0.10 -0.02 0.14 1.00
Number of Analysts 0.02 0.37 0.38 0.23 0.64 -0.16 0.16 -0.02 0.23 0.01 -0.01 -0.18 -0.32 1.00
Return on Assets -0.14 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.29 -0.27 0.11 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.17 -0.21 0.18 1.00
Leverage 0.00 0.10 -0.11 0.20 0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.13 1.00
Firm Age 0.02 0.26 -0.08 0.39 0.34 -0.27 -0.08 -0.01 -0.23 0.38 0.01 0.10 -0.13 0.05 0.12 0.13 1.00
R&D -0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.19 0.18 -0.13 -0.03 0.01 -0.13 0.19 0.01 0.10 -0.09 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.32 1.00

















































































Aggregate connections 0.71 1.00
Institutional OIB 0.00 -0.04 1.00
Board size 0.01 0.61 -0.02 1.00
Firm size 0.04 0.60 -0.05 0.49 1.00
IVOL 0.04 -0.14 0.01 -0.20 -0.28 1.00
Institutional ownership 0.04 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.17 -0.06 1.00
Momentum -0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.03 1.00
Turnover 0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.09 0.16 0.21 0.43 0.08 1.00
Number of Segments 0.05 0.24 -0.01 0.32 0.26 -0.14 -0.06 0.00 -0.17 1.00
Return 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
Book-to-Market -0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.11 -0.31 0.04 -0.14 -0.32 -0.26 0.14 -0.04 1.00
Illiquidity -0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.22 0.08 -0.21 -0.04 -0.29 -0.03 0.00 0.19 1.00
Number of Analysts 0.03 0.44 -0.06 0.23 0.67 -0.11 0.33 -0.05 0.46 0.00 -0.01 -0.27 -0.21 1.00
Return on Assets -0.14 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.27 -0.21 0.15 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 0.14 1.00
Leverage -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.21 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.09 1.00
Firm Age 0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.35 0.30 -0.19 -0.04 -0.02 -0.17 0.36 0.00 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.14 0.12 1.00
Option 0.09 0.28 -0.04 0.10 0.38 -0.04 0.29 -0.02 0.44 0.00 -0.01 -0.22 -0.19 0.51 0.05 0.03 0.00 1.00
R&D 0.26 0.04 0.02 -0.26 -0.15 0.18 -0.07 -0.02 0.17 -0.21 -0.01 -0.28 0.00 0.02 -0.40 -0.21 -0.21 0.08 1.00
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Table 4
Board connectedness, informed trading, and stock returns: Portfolio approach.
This table presents Fama-French four-factor alphas (αs) from portfolios formed as follows. Each month
we first rank stocks into three groups by Connectedness. Then the stocks are sorted into quintiles on the
basis of three informed trading variables: monthly short interest (Panel A); monthly option/stock volume
(Panel B); and weekly institutional trade order imbalance, Institutional OIB (Panel C). Connectedness is
the residual obtained from a regression of the natural logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural
logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of analysts and institutional ownership. In Panels A and
B (Panel C), portfolios are rebalanced every month (week). The sample consists of common stocks listed
on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December
2011. Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, of the difference between the highest and lowest quintiles of
the informed trading variables, are reported below the coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Short Interest
115,978 firm-month observations
All Low Med High High−Low
S1 0.728 0.674 0.600 0.846
S2 0.481 0.307 0.507 0.595
S3 0.410 0.278 0.438 0.578
S4 0.157 0.237 0.034 0.154
S5 −0.156 −0.023 −0.081 −0.315
S5 − S1 −0.884a −0.697a −0.681a −1.161a −0.464a
t (−4.18) (−3.43) (−2.63) (−4.54) (−3.89)
Panel B: Option/Stock volume
80,042 firm-month observation
All Low Med High High−Low
O/S1 0.493 0.395 0.588 0.763
O/S2 0.447 0.420 0.296 0.554
O/S3 0.167 0.206 0.214 0.092
O/S4 0.110 0.334 0.069 −0.008
O/S5 −0.130 −0.226 0.016 −0.199
O/S5 − O/S1 −0.623a −0.621b −0.572b −0.962a −0.340a
t (−3.29) (−2.51) (−2.17) (−3.61) (−2.64)
Panel C: Institutional OIB
512,509 firm-week observations
All Low Med High High−Low
OIBS1 0.120 0.117 0.156 0.086
OIBS2 0.031 0.058 0.013 0.025
OIBS3 0.041 0.053 0.037 0.027
OIBS4 0.047 0.025 0.060 0.056
OIBS5 0.158 0.102 0.169 0.205
OIBS5 − OIBS1 0.038 −0.015 0.013 0.119b 0.134b
t (1.18) (−0.40) (0.23) (2.13) (2.14)
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Table 5
Board Connectedness, informed trading, and stock returns: Multivariate regressions.
This table presents the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on informed trading variables, con-
nectedness, and other firm characteristics. The informed trading variables are monthly short interest, Option/Stock
volume, and institutional trading order imbalance (Institutional OIB) in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Decile
ranks of these variables are used in the regressions. Connectedness is the residual obtained from a regression of the
natural logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of ana-
lysts and institutional ownership. The dependent variables are monthly future stock returns in columns (1) and (2), and
weekly future stock returns in column (3). The firm characteristics are as defined in Table 1. The sample consists of
common stocks listed on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002
to December 2011. Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, are reported below the coefficient estimates. Superscripts













Institutional OIB × Connectedness 0.094b
(2.10)
Connectedness 0.319a 0.241b −0.026
(2.72) (2.15) (−0.90)
Firm size −0.357a −0.136b −0.135a
(−3.37) (−2.03) (−3.94)
Return −1.975a −2.338a −2.395a
(−3.39) (−2.72) (−4.49)
Institutional ownership 0.065 0.057 0.145
(0.19) (0.12) (1.18)
Firm Age 0.076 −0.040 0.056a
(1.43) (−0.84) (2.80)
Book-to-Market 0.039 0.010 −0.515a
(0.36) (0.08) (−7.41)
Leverage 0.468 0.327 −0.163
(1.15) (0.69) (−1.54)
Number of Analysts −0.019 0.131 −0.028
(−0.19) (0.88) (−0.98)
R&D 0.915 2.996c −2.364
(0.55) (1.83) (−5.56)
Turnover 0.277a 0.112 0.027
(3.85) (0.95) (0.37)




Return on Assets 1.068c 0.663 −0.585b
(1.82) (1.27) (−2.46)
Momentum −0.572 −0.824 −0.477b
(−0.87) (−1.63) (−2.45)
Number of Segments −0.001 0.007 0.012
(−0.13) (0.78) (7.01)
IVOL −8.932 −10.246c 0.199
(−1.27) (−1.78) (0.14)
Intercept 5.808a 2.533a 1.418a
(3.50) (2.87) (3.42)
Adj. R2 9.2% 15.3% 12.8%
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Table 6
Board connectedness, informed traders, and earnings surprises.
This table presents the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of earnings surprises on informed trading variables, connectedness, and other firm char-
acteristics. The informed trading variables are monthly short interest, Option/Stock volume, and institutional trading order imbalance (Institutional OIB).
Decile ranks of these variables are used in the regressions. Connectedness is the residual obtained from a regression of the natural logarithm of aggregate
connections on the natural logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of analysts and institutional ownership. The dependent variables are three
different measures of earnings surprise: Unexpected Earnings, Standardized Unexpected Earnings (SUE) and Analyst Surprise. Unexpected Earnings is
calculated as (EPS i,q − EPS i,q−4)/Pi,q−4, where EPS i,q and EPS i,q−4 are earnings per share before extraordinary items for firm i in quarters q and q − 4,
respectively, and Piq−4 is the stock price in quarter q − 4. SUE is calculated as (EPS i,q − EPS i,q−4 − µi,q)/σi,q, where µi,q and σi,q are the mean and standard
deviations of earnings changes (EPS i,q−EPS i,q−4) in the previous eight quarters, respectively. Analyst surprise is the difference between actual earnings per
share (EPS) reported in I/B/E/S in quarter q, and the median of the most recent forecasts made by analysts following the firm over the 90 days prior to the
earnings announcement; this difference is then scaled by Pi,q−4. The sample consists of common stocks listed on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board
data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December 2011. Industry fixed effects are included in all specifications. Other controls are the same as
those used in Table 5 and are as defined in Table 1. Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, are reported below the coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b,
and c indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Unexpected Earnings SUE Analyst Surprise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Short Interest −0.659a 0.902 −0.028a
(−3.00) (0.56) (−2.64)
Short Interest × Connectedness −0.681b −5.640a 0.004
(−2.52) (−3.07) (0.31)
Option/Stock volume −0.141b 1.734 −0.008
(−2.44) (0.91) (−0.94)
Option/Stock volume × Connectedness −0.439a −4.884b −0.046b
(−3.69) (−2.26) (−1.99)
Institutional OIB 0.059 5.858a 0.065a
(0.39) (3.11) (4.67)
Institutional OIB × Connectedness 0.259 −0.964 0.041c
(1.42) (−0.26) (1.78)
Connectedness 0.522b 0.290b 0.184 1.506 2.034 −0.199 0.008b 0.044 −0.010
(1.95) (2.41) (0.92) (1.29) (1.24) (−0.10) (0.76) (2.39) (−0.60)
Lag Surprise 1.277 2.665 3.449b 27.065a 26.988 0.032a 3.942a 5.703 0.000
(1.08) (1.48) (2.16) (18.39) (17.87) (0.07) (6.24) (7.23) (−0.06)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R 2 15.0% 15.7% 16.7% 18.81% 19.91% 17.76% 14.15% 14.12% 9.99%
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Table 7
Board connectedness, informed traders, and firm-specific news sentiment.
This table presents the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of news sentiment on informed trading variables,
connectedness, and other firm characteristics. The informed trading variables are monthly short interest, Option/Stock
volume, and institutional trading order imbalance (Institutional OIB) in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Decile
ranks of these variables are used in the regressions. Connectedness is the residual obtained from a regression of the
natural logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of
analysts and institutional ownership. The dependent variable is the difference between positive and negative news
sentiment of firm-specific news from Thomson Reuters News Analytics. The sample consists of common stocks listed
on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December 2011,
and news sentiment data from Thomson Reuters. Industry fixed effects are included in all specifications. Other firm
characteristics are as defined in Table 1. Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, are reported below the coefficient












Institutional OIB × Connectedness 1.242b
(2.26)
Connectedness 2.213a 1.770a 1.042b
(4.91) (6.95) (2.13)
Firm Size −0.433a 0.137c 1.071a
(−5.45) (1.75) (5.60)
Return 4.749a 8.399a 21.379a
(3.00) (3.75) (6.05)
Institutional ownership 1.526 0.462 2.599a
(0.95) (0.28) (3.22)
Firm Age 0.198 0.386b 0.219
(1.59) (2.41) (1.26)
Book-to-Market −1.238a −0.926b −0.976a
(−3.61) (−2.08) (−4.35)
Leverage −2.460a −1.310c −0.226
(−6.56) (−1.68) (−0.31)
Number of Analysts 0.398b −0.080 0.437
(2.48) (−0.15) (1.09)
R&D 13.932a 15.167a 14.489a
(4.30) (2.12) (5.43)
Turnover 0.715b 0.217 −0.520
(2.53) (1.36) (−1.42)




Return on Assets 1.284 4.318b 3.253a
(1.49) (2.19) (3.10)
Momentum 2.681a 2.949a 2.280a
(3.47) (4.53) (3.76)
Number of Segments 0.022 −0.013 0.060b
(1.46) (−0.77) (2.53)
IVOL −60.29a −47.78 −46.31a
(−4.44) (−1.46) (−7.10)
Lag_NEWS 24.98a 25.98a 12.10a
(49.69) (36.88) (18.38)
Intercept 15.582a 9.323a −9.292a
(7.53) (3.01) (−3.82)
Adj. R2 15.3% 16.6% 7.4%
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Table 8
Board Connectedness, informed trading, and stock returns: Alternative explanations.
This table presents the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on informed trading vari-
ables, connectedness, and other firm characteristics, in which we control for family firm status (Panel A)
and number of employees (Panel B). Connectedness is the residual obtained from a regression of the natural
logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural logarithm of firm size, board size, firm age, number of
analysts and institutional ownership. The dependent variables are monthly future stock returns in columns
(1) – (4), and weekly future stock returns in columns (5) and (6). Family firm is as defined as in Anderson
et al. (2012). Outsider is the ratio of outside directors to board size. Asset Tangibility is defined as the
ratio Property, Plants, and Equipment (PPE) to total assets. The sample consists of common stocks listed
on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December
2011. Industry fixed effects and other control variables that are identical to those included in Table 5 (as
defined in Table 1) are included in all specifications. Newey-West t-statistics, in parentheses, are reported
below the coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Controlling for family firm status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short Interest −0.427 −0.392
(−1.57) (−1.48)
Short Interest × Connectedness −0.428a
(−4.70)
Option/Stock volume −0.772a −0.767a
(−4.52) (−4.48)
Option/Stock volume × Connectedness −0.471b
(−1.98)
Institutional OIB 0.099b 0.091b
(2.47) (2.34)
Institutional OIB × Connectedness 0.107b
(2.49)
Connectedness 0.250a 0.195c −0.071a
(2.92) (1.93) (−2.59)
Family firm −0.124 −0.082 −0.367 −0.362 0.031 0.019
(−0.87) (−0.64) (−1.52) (−1.50) (0.93) (0.61)
Short Interest × Family firm −0.155 −0.226c
(−1.55) (−1.88)
Option/Stock volume × Family firm 0.350 0.341
(1.26) (1.26)
Institutional OIB × Family firm −0.016 0.006
(−0.41) (0.12)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 6.19% 6.30% 7.14% 7.33% 5.49% 5.64%
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Panel B: Controlling for number of outside directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short Interest −1.305a −1.237a
(−4.77) (−4.62)
Short Interest × Connectedness −0.431a
(−2.87)
Option/Stock volume −1.279a −1.197b
(−2.63) (−2.25)
Option/Stock volume × Connectedness −0.411c
(−1.70)
Institutional OIB 0.063 0.040
(1.22) (0.80)
Institutional OIB × Connectedness 0.107b
(2.46)
Connectedness 0.309a 0.214c −0.037
(2.58) (1.95) (−1.32)
Outsider −0.254 −0.058 −1.718a −1.499b −0.054 −0.095
(−0.59) (−0.14) (−2.86) (−2.14) (−0.27) (−0.49)
Short Interest × Outsider 1.601 1.339
(1.22) (0.99)
Option/Stock volume × Outsider 3.742b 3.239
(2.06) (1.55)
Institutional OIB × Outsider −0.016 0.095
(−0.07) (0.41)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 9.22% 9.31% 15.19% 15.29% 12.78% 12.86%
Panel C: Controlling for asset tangibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short Interest −1.400a −1.334a
(−4.14) (−3.97)
Short Interest × Connectedness −0.386a
(−2.92)
Option/Stock volume −0.444b −0.391b
(−2.52) (−2.06)
Option/Stock volume × Connectedness −0.468a
(−2.74)
Institutional OIB 0.124a 0.107a
(4.16) (3.44)
Institutional OIB × Connectedness 0.093b
(1.96)
Connectedness 0.338a 0.293a −0.015
(3.36) (3.47) (−0.54)
Asset Tangibility 0.144 0.277 1.136c 1.258b 0.434a 0.419a
(0.40) (0.81) (1.80) (2.01) (3.61) (3.47)
Short Interest × Asset Tangibility 1.447a 1.289a
(3.47) (3.31)
Option/Stock volume × Asset Tangibility −0.457 −0.713
(−0.56) (−0.86)
Institutional OIB × Asset Tangibility −0.240a −0.189c
(−2.67) (−1.91)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 9.48 9.54 15.28 15.36 12.83 12.90
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Table 9
Board Connectedness, informed trading and stock returns: Within-firm regressions.
This table presents the results from firm fixed effects (within-firm) regressions of stock returns on informed trading
variables, connectedness, and other firm characteristics. Connectedness is the residual obtained from a regression of
the natural logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural logarithm of firm size and board size. The dependent
variables are monthly future stock returns in columns (1) and (2), and weekly future stock returns in column (3). The
firm characteristics are as defined in Table 1. The sample consists of common stocks listed on AMEX, NASDAQ
and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002 to December 2011. Other control variables
are identical to those included in Table 5, and are defined in Table 1. Firm and time fixed effects are included in all
specifications. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors and clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses below the












Institutional OIB × Connectedness 0.087c
(1.79)
Connectedness 0.415 −0.230 −0.080
(1.42) (−0.66) (−1.23)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Month Month Week
Adj. R2 23.8% 26.7% 27.4%
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Table 10
Board Connectedness and the probability of adverse selection in trading.
This table presents results pertaining to the relation between changes in proxies for adverse selection in the cost of
trading, and changes in Connectedness. The PIN measure is that constructed by Brown and Hillegeist (2007) who
extend that developed by Easley et al. (1997). Spread is the difference between ask price and bid price (ask-bid)
divided by the mid point of bid and ask spread, averaged over the year to obtain average annual bid ask spread.
Illiquidity is as defined in Amihud (2002). Connectedness is the residual obtained from a regression of the natural
logarithm of aggregate connections on the natural logarithm of firm size and board size. The sample consists of
common stocks listed on AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE with board data in the BoardEx database from January 2002
to December 2011. In Panel A, firms are sorted into quintiles based on annual mean change in Connectedness, such
that C1 (C5) is the quintile that experienced the least (most) change in Connectedness, and we report the mean change
in the adverse selection proxies for each of the quintiles. In Panel B the dependent variable is the annual change in
the adverse selection proxies, and the key explanatory variable is annual change in Connectedness (∆Connectedness).
Other firm characteristics are as defined in Table 1. Newey-West t-statistics, are reported in parentheses. Superscripts
a, b, and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Change in connectedness and adverse selection proxies: Quintiles
Change in Connectedness quintiles (C) C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C5 − C1 t(C5 − C1)
Mean Change in Connectedness −0.239 −0.059 0.015 0.096 0.332
Mean Change in PIN measure −0.611 −0.003 −0.396 0.392 0.641 1.252a (5.49)
Mean Change in Spread (%) −0.186 −0.140 −0.129 −0.105 −0.088 0.098b (2.08)
Mean Change in Illiquidity −0.013 −0.005 0.004 0.005 0.037 0.051a (2.70)
Panel B: Change in connectedness and adverse selection proxies: Multivariate regressions
Change in PIN Change in Spread Change in Illiquidity
∆Connectedness 0.624a 0.557a 0.006b 0.005b 0.377b 0.348b
(3.10) (2.91) (2.22) (2.02) (2.35) (2.46)
Firm Size −0.217 −0.341 0.000 0.007 −0.214 −0.571
(−0.74) (−0.99) (0.03) (0.59) (−0.25) (−0.88)
Inst. Own. 0.962 1.389 0.021 0.048 2.299 2.345
(1.13) (1.45) (0.58) (1.55) (0.49) (0.54)
BM 0.073 0.026 −0.003 0.003 2.092b 2.723c
(0.74) (0.35) (−0.22) (0.32) (2.03) (1.83)
Turnover 0.745a 0.695a 0.035 0.020 −2.040 −2.749
(3.19) (2.66) (0.91) (0.56) (−0.75) (−0.96)
MOM −1.160a −1.310a −0.133a −0.133a −0.836 −0.331
(−4.36) (−3.45) (−3.30) (−3.46) (−0.73) (−0.25)
IVOL −15.937b −3.404 −0.794 −0.800 44.314 73.891
(−2.36) (−0.51) (−0.78) (−0.82) (0.54) 0.71)
Return −2.979a −0.224a −12.734b
(−6.28) (−4.53) (−2.03)
Firm Age 0.472b −0.015 0.303
(2.07) (−1.25) (1.26)
Leverage −0.205 −0.053 5.325
(−0.31) (−0.84) (1.56)
Number of Analysts 0.743 0.008 1.506c
(1.42) (1.38) (1.82)
R&D −1.681 0.056 20.620
(−0.77) (0.83) (1.32)
Performance −0.908 −0.103 5.226
(−0.58) (−1.62) (0.74)
Number of Segments −0.010 −0.001a −0.087
(−0.55) (−2.70) (−0.94)
Intercept 0.524 0.543 −0.141 −0.163 4.913 4.916
(0.11) (0.14) (−0.66) (−0.81) (0.30) (0.37)
Adj. R2 4.30% 4.87% 28.09% 31.34% 13.27% 14.77%
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Figure 1: Annual quintile hedge portfolio returns for each connectedness tercile. For each of our informed
trading values (Short Interest, Option/Stock Volume and Institutional OIB), we divide our firms into three
groups based on the magnitude of Connectedness. The figure shows the annualized stock return, for each
connectedness tercile, in each year, for the hedge portfolio that is long the firms in the highest quintile of the

































Figure 2. Cumulative abnormal returns scaled by total returns over the sixty day window leading to earnings
announcement. Firms are divided deciles based on their earnings surprises such that firms in the first decile
have the most negative earning surprises and firms in the tenth decile have the most positive. Figure 2a
shows the returns for firms that report the most negative earnings surprise. Figure 2b shows the returns for
firms that report the most positive earnings surprise.
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